Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools by Kim, Catherine Y.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 43 | Issue 1 Article 2
Fall 2015
Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools
Catherine Y. Kim
University of North Carolina School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons,
Constitutional Law Commons, Education Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Catherine Y. Kim, Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools, 43 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 91 (2017) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol43/iss1/2
PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL ACROSS  
POLICYMAKING TOOLS 
CATHERINE Y. KIM 
ABSTRACT 
Over the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have observed the President’s 
growing control over agency policymaking and the separation-of-powers concerns implicated by 
such unilateral exercises of power. The paradigmatic form of agency policymaking—notice-and-
comment rulemaking—mitigates these concerns by ensuring considerable oversight by the courts, 
Congress, and the public at large. Agencies, however, typically have at their disposal a variety of 
policymaking tools with which to implement White House goals, including the issuance of guid-
ance documents and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion. While commentators have 
drawn attention to the risk that agencies will circumvent the extensive checks associated with 
rulemaking by issuing a guidance document instead, this Article argues that the potential for an 
agency to forego both rulemaking and guidance documents in favor of the strategic exercise of 
enforcement discretion poses a greater threat of unchecked unilateral power. It presents a case 
study of the use of these different policymaking tools in the Department of Education’s Office for 
Civil Rights (OCR), finding that while agencies are able to weaken external checks on presiden-
tial policy preferences by employing guidance documents instead of rulemaking, they can virtual-
ly eliminate such checks by implementing White House goals through the strategic exercise of 
enforcement discretion. This Article closes by evaluating potential reforms to temper politically 
motivated exercises of enforcement discretion, focusing not only on external mechanisms of over-
sight, but also on the role of the civil service bureaucracy within the agency itself.  
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
For the past quarter century, administrative law scholars have 
raised separation-of-powers concerns regarding the White House’s 
steady expansion of control over agency policymaking, or “presiden-
tial administration.”1 Left unchecked, such exercises of unilateral 
power challenge fundamental norms of administrative legitimacy, 
including those resting on legislative supremacy, democratic ac-
countability, and technocratic expertise.2 They may undermine rule-
of-law values by permitting the President to develop policies contrary 
to congressional will. They may compromise norms of democratic de-
cision-making by potentially excluding public input from the devel-
opment of policy. Finally, they may subordinate objective, expert-
driven decision-making to the President’s raw political calculus.  
Administrative law seeks to mitigate these concerns by empower-
ing external institutions—including the courts, Congress, and the 
public at large—to constrain presidential policymaking discretion.3 
Courts exercise legal checks by scrutinizing agency decisions for fi-
delity to congressional goals and policing against arbitrary or biased 
decision-making.4 Congress and the public also play important  
                                                                                                                       
 1. Then-professor Elena Kagan famously coined the term “presidential administra-
tion” to describe the “recent and dramatic” transformation rendering “regulatory activity of 
the executive branch agencies more and more an extension of the President’s own policy 
and political agenda.” Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 
2246, 2248 (2001). Presidential control has since become the dominant model for under-
standing decision-making in the administrative state. See, e.g., David J. Barron, From 
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095 (2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside 
the Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. 
L. REV. 47 (2006); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision 
Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers 
to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling 
Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016). 
 2. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legit-
imacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 461 (2003); Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary 
Administration: Rethinking Popular Representation in Agency Rulemaking, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
441 (2010); Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to 
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51 (2007); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era 
of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123 (1994); Mendelson, supra note 1; Gillian 
E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 479 (2010); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An 
Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016); 
Watts, supra note 1.  
 3. See Metzger, supra note 2 (arguing that “ordinary” administrative law addresses 
constitutional concerns, particularly those related to separation-of-powers).  
 4. Scholars have long emphasized the importance of such legal constraints, with 
some suggesting that the very legitimacy of the administrative state hinges on the availa-
bility of judicial review. See Louis L. Jaffe, The Right to Judicial Review, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
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roles.5 Congress disciplines agency policymaking through funding 
mechanisms, oversight hearings, and the threat of legislative rever-
sal.6 Finally, the public disciplines agency policymaking by mobiliz-
ing political pressure on the agency, the White House, or Congress  
to intervene.  
Importantly, however, the operation of these checks varies consid-
erably, depending on the particular policymaking tool employed by 
the agency.7 Agencies may implement White House goals through a 
variety of policymaking tools. The paradigmatic tool, notice-and-
comment rulemaking, exposes presidential policies to extensive ex-
ternal oversight.8 Courts exercise both procedural and substantive 
review over rulemaking decisions, ensuring that such policies comply 
with legislative directives and are sufficiently rationalized. Congress 
and the public likewise discipline agency rulemaking by exercising 
political pressure.9  
                                                                                                                       
401, 401 (1958) (“The availability of judicial review is the necessary condition, psychologi-
cally if not logically, of a system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, 
or legally valid.”). 
The drafters of the Administrative Procedure Act were well aware of the importance of 
these legal constraints, Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 848 (1985) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (maintaining that the “sine qua non of the APA was to alter inherited judicial reluc-
tance to constrain the exercise of discretionary administrative power—to rationalize and 
make fairer the exercise of such discretion”), and consciously designed expansive provisions 
for judicial review. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012) (originally 
enacted as Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)) (“A person suffering legal wrong be-
cause of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the 
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”); § 551(13) (defining 
“agency action” broadly to encompass “the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, 
sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act”); § 706(1) (requiring 
courts to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed”).  
 5. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE 
MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010) (arguing that politics, rather than law, provide the pri-
mary mechanism for constraining executive decision-making today). 
 6. Congress’s ability to reverse agency decisions is not absolute, however. See Immi-
gration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 928 (1983) (reversing one-house 
legislative veto).  
 7. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383, 1383 (2004) (discussing breadth of policymaking forms available to agencies).  
 8. The vast majority of scholarship on presidential administration focuses on White 
House control over this policymaking tool. See, e.g., Criddle, supra note 2, at 449-56 (ana-
lyzing presidential control over agency rulemaking); Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 
78-83 (discussing constraints on presidential control over agency refusals to engage in 
rulemaking); Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1131-46 (focusing on presidential influence over 
rulemaking); Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Adminis-
trative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1402 n.30 (2013) (justifying focus on rulemaking 
as central mode of agency policymaking); Watts, supra note 1 (focusing on presidential 
control over rulemaking while acknowledging that policies made through adjudication and 
enforcement decisions sometimes overlap with rulemaking). 
 9. The extensiveness of constraints on rulemaking has generated widespread com-
plaints of policy “ossification.” See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossify-
ing” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways 
to Deossify Agency Rulemaking, 47 Admin. L. Rev. 59 (1995); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystify-
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Alternatively, agencies may pursue the President’s agenda by is-
suing an informal guidance document simply announcing the new 
policy in a memorandum, circular, bulletin, or manual, for example.10 
Guidance documents are subject to weaker external constraints than 
rulemaking, as they generally evade judicial review and attract less 
legislative and public attention than rulemaking.   
Finally, agencies may implement White House goals through the 
strategic exercise of enforcement discretion, targeting particular is-
sues for compliance investigation and aggressively negotiating set-
tlements to require adherence to particular policy goals. Although 
strategic exercises of discretion typically are accompanied by a guid-
ance document directing street-level enforcement decisions, it is at 
least conceivable that the President’s goals can be achieved through 
this mechanism without being memorialized in a written directive. If 
so, the resulting policy could potentially evade external oversight al-
together. Compliance investigations rarely reach the formal agency 
adjudication necessary for judicial review and may be undisclosed to 
both Congress and the public.   
Commentators have expressed much concern that agencies employ 
guidance documents opportunistically to circumvent the more exten-
sive checks imposed on rulemaking.11 The Supreme Court noted this 
concern in its recent decision in Mortgage Bankers’ Ass’n v. Perez, 
frankly acknowledging that “[t]here may be times when an agency’s 
decision to issue an interpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, is 
driven primarily by a desire to skirt notice-and-comment provi-
sions.”12 It is likely to revisit the issue again in the current Term, 
having granted certiorari in Texas v. United States, in which the 
Fifth Circuit rejected the administration’s attempt to characterize its 
program granting relief to undocumented immigrants as a mere poli-
cy statement exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking require-
                                                                                                                       
ing Deossification, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (1997); Paul R. Verkuil, Rulemaking Ossification—A 
Modest Proposal, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 453 (1995).  
 10. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines a “guidance document” as 
an “agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other than a regulatory 
action . . . that sets forth a policy on a statutory, regulatory, or technical issue or an inter-
pretation of a statutory or regulatory issue.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. NO. 07-02, FINAL BULLETIN FOR AGENCY GOOD GUIDANCE 
PRACTICES 6 (2007). It notes that such documents may describe an agency’s interpretation 
of existing law or how it “will treat or enforce a governing legal norm.” Id. at 2. 
 11. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1311, 1312-19, 1318 n.23 (1992); Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Infor-
mal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 420-33 (2007); Mark Seidenfeld, Sub-
stituting Substantive for Procedural Review of Guidance Documents, 90 TEX. L. REV. 331 
(2011). 
 12. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015). 
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ments.13 These cases have drawn increased attention to the concern 
that agencies abuse guidance documents to weaken external checks 
on their discretion.  
Yet few have examined the potential for agencies to circumvent 
external checks altogether by pursuing presidential goals through 
the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion in lieu of either rule-
making or guidance documents.14 The virtual absence of constraints 
on exercises of enforcement discretion suggests that White House pol-
icies implemented through this tool pose an even greater threat of 
unchecked power than the use of guidance documents.   
This Article evaluates the extent to which agencies employ differ-
ent policymaking tools to advance presidential goals, and the extent 
to which such policymaking is subject to external oversight, through 
a case study of policymaking in the Department of Education’s Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR). With an annual budget of approximately $100 
million15 and a staff of over 500 officials,16 OCR is responsible for en-
forcing federal prohibitions against discrimination across our nation’s 
primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools.17 While the im-
                                                                                                                       
 13. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 171-76 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 136 S. 
Ct. 906 (2016) (mem.).  
 14. Although a number of scholars have begun examining the use of enforcement dis-
cretion as a policymaking tool, they have focused on instances in which such policies were 
memorialized in a guidance document directing street-level officers on how their discretion 
should be exercised. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1031 (2013); Joseph Landau, DOMA and Presidential Discretion: Interpreting and 
Enforcing Federal Law, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 619 (2012); Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, 
Presidential Inaction and the Separation of Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1195 (2014); Zacha-
ry S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671 (2014). The 
administration’s policy of non-enforcement in the marijuana, Affordable Care Act, and 
immigration contexts reflect this pattern.  
 15. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2014 BUDGET 
REQUEST 1 (2014) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST], 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget14/justifications/bb-ocr.pdf. 
 16. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., HELPING TO ENSURE EQUAL 
ACCESS TO EDUCATION: REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FY 
2009-12, at 3 (2012) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12], 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-2009-12.pdf; OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROTECTING CIVIL RIGHTS, ADVANCING EQUITY: 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF EDUCATION FY 13-14, at 8 (2015) [hereinaf-
ter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14], http://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/reports/annual/ocr/report-to-president-and-secretary-of-education-2013-14.pdf.  
 17. OCR enforces a number of statutory mandates. See Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (prohibiting sex discrimination by educa-
tional institutions); Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012) (prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of age); Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29  
U.S.C. § 701 (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability); Title VI of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of race, color or national origin by recipients of federal financial assistance). In addition, 
OCR possesses authority to enforce the Boy Scouts of American Equal Access Act of 2001 
and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See Boy Scouts with Disabilities 
Act of 1990, 20 U.S.C. § 7905 (2012) (mandating public schools to provide equal access to 
school facilities); Title II of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
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portance of OCR’s mission renders this agency worthy of study in its 
own right, it suggests broader lessons about constraints on presiden-
tial control across the administrative state. The case study confirms 
that agencies regularly implement White House goals through guid-
ance documents, thereby avoiding the more robust constraints on 
rulemaking; crucially, however, it also suggests that agencies imple-
ment presidential policy preferences through the strategic exercise of 
enforcement discretion and, in doing so, evade even the modest 
checks associated with guidance documents. This evidence suggests 
that proposals to limit an agency’s ability to weaken external checks 
on presidential policies by relying on guidance documents may be 
counterproductive, as the agency could simply respond by channeling 
policymaking through the strategic exercise of enforcement discre-
tion, potentially eliminating such oversight altogether. 
 Part I explores mechanisms of presidential control over dif-
ferent forms of agency policymaking and the incentives for politically 
motivated agencies to employ certain forms opportunistically to min-
imize external constraints. It then sets forth the contours of the em-
pirical debate over the extent to which agencies engage in such op-
portunism. Part II assesses this empirical question, presenting a case 
study of policymaking in the Office for Civil Rights. It detects signifi-
cant policy shifts in OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion, shifts 
that have evaded meaningful external oversight. Part III explores 
potential reforms to temper politically motivated exercises of en-
forcement discretion. It concludes that prospects for strengthening 
external oversight are limited, counseling in favor of a turn inward to 
empower the civil service bureaucracy within the agency itself.18 
                                                                                                                       
(2012) (prohibiting discrimination the basis of disability by any public entity, regardless of 
receipt of federal funds). 
 18. A growing body of literature on “internal separation of powers” explores the poten-
tial for institutional design reforms focusing on agency structures and processes to disci-
pline agency policymaking. See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 633, 688-89 (2000) (proposing bureaucratic reforms to enhance functional 
specialization and cabin politicization of agencies); Rebecca Ingber, Interpretation Catalysts 
and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 359 (2013) (examining 
effects of institutional design on executive branch legal decision-making); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from 
Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) (outlining structural mechanisms to cabin executive 
branch policymaking discretion); Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power 
Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J. 1032, 1035 (2011) (exploring the impact of agency structure 
and design on substantive decision-making); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to 
Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship 
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Metzger, Interdependent Relationship]; Daphna Renan, Pooling Powers, 115 COLUM. L. 
REV. 211 (2015) (examining the impact of interagency structures on executive branch  
policymaking).  
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II.   CONSTRAINTS ON PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION  
Agencies typically possess at their disposal a variety of policymak-
ing tools, including rulemaking, the issuance of guidance documents, 
and the strategic exercise of enforcement discretion.19 First, agencies 
may engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking to produce legally 
binding “legislative rules.”20 Second, they may issue a “guidance doc-
ument,” defined by the Office of Management and Budget as “an 
agency statement of general applicability and future effect, other 
than a regulatory action . . . that sets forth a policy on a statutory, 
regulatory, or technical issue or an interpretation of a statutory or 
regulatory issue.”21 These documents appear in a variety of formats, 
including memoranda, circulars, bulletins, and manuals,22 and are 
exempt from the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements.23 A third 
policymaking tool frequently available to agencies is the strategic 
exercise of enforcement discretion. Decisions regarding which cases 
to investigate and how to resolve them provide a powerful tool to 
shape behavior and achieve policy goals. This policymaking tool often 
overlaps with the second policymaking tool, for example when a 
guidance document instructs officials how they should exercise their 
discretion in individual cases. It is at least conceivable, however, that 
individual enforcement decisions reflect larger policy goals even 
without being memorialized in a guidance document. 
The precise mechanisms of presidential influence over each of 
these policymaking tools differ, and mechanisms of external over-
sight of such presidential influence likewise vary based on the poli-
cymaking tool employed. This variability creates incentives for agen-
cies to employ certain tools opportunistically to minimize checks on 
their discretion, although practical and doctrinal considerations may 
counterbalance these incentives. Consequently, the extent to which 
agencies engage in such opportunistic behavior remains an open em-
pirical question.   
                                                                                                                       
 19. Congress sometimes limits the policymaking tools available to an agency. For 
example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 vested the Equal Employment Opportuni-
ty Commission with the authority to investigate complaints alleging employment discrimi-
nation but denied it the authority to develop substantive regulations interpreting the stat-
ute or to initiate judicial or administrative enforcement proceedings. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 
Stat. 252 (1964). The EEOC’s powers have since been amended. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act 
of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, 
Pub. L. No. 111-12, 123 Stat. 5.  
 20. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); see Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 
(2015) (noting that rules promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking are 
entitled to binding force of law).  
 21. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10,  
at 6.  
 22. Id. at 2. 
 23. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (exempting “interpretive guidance” and “general statements of poli-
cy” from notice-and-comment requirements).  
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A.   Mechanisms of Presidential Control Across Policymaking Tools  
Few today contest that agency policymaking is subject to an un-
precedented degree of control by the President. The precise mecha-
nisms of such control may vary, however, depending on which poli-
cymaking tool is employed.  
The mechanisms of presidential influence over agency rulemaking 
have been well documented.24 First, the appointment power allows 
the White House to install ideological allies in the agency leadership 
positions to which rulemaking authority is delegated.25 Second, the 
emergence of centralized regulatory review has facilitated presiden-
tial control over rulemaking. Since the 1970s, presidents have issued 
a series of Executive Orders requiring agencies to submit all “signifi-
cant” rulemaking proposals for pre-clearance by the Office of Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the White House’s Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB).26 While OIRA does not claim 
formal authority to reject proposals, the White House routinely nego-
tiates changes and may quash proposals by delaying approval in-
definitely.27 These two developments—the expansion of political 
                                                                                                                       
 24. See sources cited supra note 8. 
 25. See Barron, supra note 1, at 1121-33 (discussing increased politicization of admin-
istrative agencies due to growing number of presidential appointments and aggressive 
White House screening of candidates); see also DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF 
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS: POLITICAL CONTROL AND BUREAUCRATIC PERFORMANCE 
(2008). The Constitution provides little guidance for the appointment of administrative 
officials, stating only that:  
[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers 
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the 
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by 
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think prop-
er, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of De-
partments.  
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. It does not define “non-inferior” officers, nor does it specify 
appointment procedures for administrative officials below non-inferior officers.  
 26. See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010); Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 
191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2010); Exec. Order 12,866, 3 
C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), revoked by Exec. Order No. 
12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, 128-30 (1982), revoked by 
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. at 649; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-19, LEGISLATIVE COORDINATION AND CLEARANCE (1972), 
revised Sept. 20, 1979.  
 27. Professor Mendelson’s empirical study shows that OIRA under President Clinton 
allowed fewer than forty percent of proposed regulations to proceed without change, while 
the Bush Administration permitted only seventeen percent of such proposals to proceed 
unaltered. Mendelson, supra note 1, at 1150. Of course, the President does not personally 
scrutinize every policy proposal subject to regulatory review. As Professors Bressman and 
Vandenbergh note, “[p]residential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it,’ ” as various White House 
offices work in conjunction with OIRA to influence agencies’ policy development.  
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 1, at 49-50. Even with this limitation, however, the 
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appointments and the emergence of centralized policy review—
ensure that agency rulemaking conforms to the White House’s politi-
cal agenda.  
These two mechanisms similarly enhance the President’s influ-
ence over agency guidance documents. Unlike rulemaking decisions, 
which typically are made by an agency’s presidentially appointed 
leader, guidance documents frequently are issued by lower-level offi-
cials. Nonetheless, the steady expansion of the President’s appoint-
ment power increases the likelihood that these lower-level officials 
have been screened for allegiance to White House policy prefer-
ences.28 The number and percentage of presidentially appointed 
agency positions has nearly doubled over the past fifty years, and the 
vast majority of these positions serve at the pleasure of the President 
with no protections from removal.29 Moreover, Congress has elimi-
nated civil service protections for large segments of the bureaucracy, 
rendering a growing number of agency officials vulnerable to removal 
on ideological grounds rather than for cause.30 As then-Professor  
David Barron observed, “Agencies are now staffed in ways that make 
them increasingly likely to speak the White House line as if it  
were their own, even if they have not been ordered to do so by the 
President.”31 Moreover, the Bush and Obama administrations have 
                                                                                                                       
process of regulatory review undoubtedly provides the White House with a powerful tool to 
shape agency policymaking.  
 28. Notwithstanding social science literature characterizing the relationship between 
Congress and the President as one of competition over agency control, see JAMES Q. 
WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989); 
Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Designing Bureaucratic Accountability, 57 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 91 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987); Mathew D. McCubbins et 
al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Politi-
cal Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431 (1989); Terry M. Moe, The Politics of Bureau-
cratic Structure, in CAN THE GOVERNMENT GOVERN? 267 (John E. Chubb & Paul E. Peter-
son eds., 1989), Congress has tended to exercise its discretion to expand the President’s 
appointment power. Even more puzzling, Congress has limited its own ability to check the 
President’s choice of appointee, expanding the number of administrative positions appoint-
ed by the President without Senate approval. See, e.g., Presidential Appointment Efficiency 
and Streamlining Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-166, 126 Stat. 1283 (codified in scattered 
sections of the U.S.C.).   
 29. DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 70, 82-83 (2012). To be sure, the 
power to appoint and remove does not grant the President unfettered control over the offi-
cials serving under him. As Professor Peter Strauss notes, while the Constitution undoubt-
edly confers on the President the power to exercise oversight over his appointee, it does not 
grant him the right to legally compel the appointee to take a particular action. Peter L. 
Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?: The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 696, 704-05 (2007). If the President is unable to persuade the appointee to adopt his 
preferred position, the only recourse available is removing the officer, which incurs  
political costs.  
 30. See LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 29, at 72-81 (describing growth of federal employ-
ment exempted from Title 5 civil service protections). 
 31. Barron, supra note 1, at 1121. 
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extended centralized regulatory review to “significant guidance doc-
uments,” enabling the White House to influence the use of this tool 
just as it influences rulemaking, providing a mechanism for the 
White House to stymie disfavored policies.32 
The mechanisms of presidential control over agency exercises of 
enforcement discretion in the absence of a guidance document are 
less apparent. Unlike both rulemaking and guidance documents, in-
dividual enforcement decisions typically are made, at least in the 
first instance, by street-level civil service bureaucrats insulated from 
political influence.33 Additionally, the system of centralized OIRA re-
view does not apply to individual enforcement decisions.  
Notwithstanding these limitations, one can readily imagine means 
by which an agency’s political leadership controls enforcement deci-
sions. It might influence those decisions ex ante by instructing lower-
level officers on how they should exercise their enforcement discre-
tion orally or through some other means than a guidance document. 
Political operatives within the agency also may control those deci-
sions ex post by requiring their personal approval for each and every 
enforcement decision. Moreover, even where agency appointees lack 
the capacity to review all decisions, they could identify a subset of 
cases of particular interest for review. In fact, agency leadership 
might be able to shape the tone and culture of the agency so effective-
ly as to influence staff behavior without any explicit commands or 
personal review at all. While career officers may not be formally 
bound by the implicit policy preferences of the political leadership, 
the desire to routinize decisions and avoid conflict with organization-
al superiors may be sufficient to achieve compliance.34 
B.   External Oversight Across Policymaking Tools 
Just as the mechanisms of presidential control differ across agen-
cy policymaking tools, the strength of external constraints to presi-
dential power varies across policymaking tools.  
                                                                                                                       
 32. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2008), revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,497,3 
C.F.R. 218 (2010); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra 
note 10; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. No. 09-
13, GUIDANCE FOR REGULATORY REVIEW (2009). 
 33. See LEWIS & SELIN, supra note 29, at 66. 
 34. See, e.g., Anthony, supra note 11, at 1363 (discussing the need for a more nuanced 
assessment of the relationship between the political appointees at agency headquarters 
and civil service staff in field offices).  
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1.   Checks on Rulemaking 
Rulemaking presents the most salient and publicly accessible form 
of agency policymaking, ensuring robust external constraints on 
White House preferences and affording the broadest protections 
against unilateral decision-making.   
The judiciary imposes strong legal constraints on presidential con-
trol over rulemaking by requiring agencies to provide a contempora-
neous, reasoned justification35 and exercising “hard-look review”36 
over rulemaking decisions. In Massachusetts v. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency,37 the Supreme Court was even willing to closely scru-
tinize an agency’s decision not to engage in rulemaking, ultimately 
rejecting what was widely viewed as a presidentially directed deci-
sion not to regulate greenhouse gases.38   
Congress and the public at large also play important roles in dis-
ciplining agency rulemaking, paying considerable attention to their 
proposals and passage.39 Specifically, the APA’s procedural require-
ments—which mandate that agencies provide the public with the 
“opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of 
written data, views, or arguments,” take these public comments into 
consideration, and publicly explain its reasons for ultimately adopt-
ing the policy40—empower the public to exercise significant checks  
on such decisions. Taken together, these mechanisms ensure that 
                                                                                                                       
 35. See SEC. v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 87, 95 (1943); Kevin M. Stack, 
The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (noting that 
Chenery I “operates both to bolster the political accountability of the agency’s action and to 
prevent arbitrariness in the agency’s exercise of discretion”). 
 36. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983); see Metzger, supra note 2, at 491 (describing hard-look review announced in State 
Farm as a judicial effort to mitigate the “risk of unaccountable and arbitrary exercises of 
administrative power”). 
 37. 549 U.S. 497, 527-28 (2007).  
 38. Id. at 533-35; see Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 83-87 (discussing strict-
ness of review applied in Massachusetts v. EPA); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, Deference 
and Democracy, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 761, 799-803 (2007) (same). 
 39. For discussions of congressional control over agency rulemaking decisions, see 
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND 
ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE (2008); Jack M. Beer-
mann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 68 (2006); Jack M. Beer-
mann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 740, 742 
(2009); Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 471, 485-86 (2011). Congress has also created an expedited legislative process to 
review agency rules before they take effect. See Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
121, §§ 251-253, 110 Stat. 868 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801-808 (2012)) (enact-
ing procedures for congressional review of agency rulemaking).  
 40. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c). The process of OIRA regulatory review exposes rulemaking to 
further public scrutiny, requiring public disclosure of cost-benefit analyses for all signifi-
cant rules. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
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presidentially directed rulemaking decisions are subject to political 
accountability, consistent with congressional intent, and not biased  
or arbitrary.   
2.   Checks on Guidance Documents 
 Presidential policies announced through the issuance of guidance 
documents are subject to comparatively weaker external constraints. 
Although guidance documents theoretically are subject to closer judi-
cial scrutiny than rulemaking,41 ripeness and finality doctrines typi-
cally preclude any judicial review at all. In National Park Hospitality 
Ass’n v. Department of the Interior,42 the Supreme Court held that an 
agency’s general statement of policy is not ripe for judicial review 
where:  
[It] does not create adverse effects of a strictly legal kind, . . . does 
not command anyone to do anything or to refrain from doing any-
thing; . . . does not grant, withhold, or modify any formal legal li-
cense, power, or authority; . . . does not subject anyone to any civil 
or criminal liability; and . . . creates no legal rights or  
obligations.43  
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia explains, “In 
terms of reviewability, legislative rules and sometimes even interpre-
tive rules may be subject to pre-enforcement judicial review, but gen-
eral statements of policy are not.”44   
Guidance documents also are subject to less congressional and 
public oversight than rulemaking. Because they are exempted from 
APA notice-and-comment requirements,45 guidance documents need 
not be subject to public comment or even publicly disclosed. It is 
worth noting that since 2007, the White House has imposed upon it-
self an obligation to publicly disclose “significant guidance docu-
ments.”46 This obligation, however, lacks any enforcement mecha-
nism and may be rescinded at any time. Even when publicly dis-
closed, guidance documents typically attract less congressional and 
public attention than rulemaking, thereby limiting mechanisms of 
political accountability.  
                                                                                                                       
 41. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254 (2001) (stating that “policy 
statements, agency manuals, and . . . enforcement guidelines” lie “beyond the Chevron 
pale” and instead are subject to the less deferential standard set forth in Skidmore (first 
citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); then citing 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944))).  
 42. 538 U.S. 803 (2003). 
 43. Id. at 809 (alterations omitted) (citations omitted).  
 44. Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. McCarthy, 758 F.3d 243, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 45. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).  
 46. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 10,  
at 21. 
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 3.   Checks on Strategic Exercises of Enforcement Discretion  
Among the policymaking tools available to agencies, the strategic 
exercise of enforcement discretion is subject to the weakest external 
constraints. Courts play a minimal role in disciplining such policies 
because enforcement decisions do not constitute “final agency action” 
subject to judicial review under the APA47 unless and until the agen-
cy completes its investigation, files an administrative complaint, and 
enters a formal adjudicative finding of noncompliance.48 The vast ma-
jority of agency enforcement decisions never reach a formal finding of 
noncompliance susceptible to judicial review.49  
Perhaps more importantly, an agency’s decision not to initiate en-
forcement proceedings generally is insulated from any review at all. 
In Heckler v. Chaney, death row inmates sued the Federal Drug Ad-
ministration for failing to prevent state prisons from using certain 
drugs in lethal injections in violation of the Federal Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act.50 Rejecting the challenge, the Supreme Court held that 
an agency’s refusal to initiate investigative or enforcement proceed-
ings is a decision “committed to agency discretion” and thus pre-
sumptively immune from judicial review.51 Heckler provided, howev-
er, that the presumption of non-reviewability might be reversed in 
certain narrow circumstances.52 
                                                                                                                       
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 704. 
 48. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 239-41 (1980) 
(concluding initiation of administrative adjudication proceedings does not constitute “final 
agency action” subject to review); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. Consumer Prod. 
Safety Comm’n, 324 F.3d 726, 731-32 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (concluding that agency investiga-
tion and request for voluntary corrective action does not constitute “final agency action” 
subject to judicial review).  
 49. See Michael Herz & Neal Devins, The Consequences of DOJ Control of Litigation 
on Agencies’ Programs, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1345, 1368-69 (2000) (noting that the “huge ma-
jority of administrative enforcement proceedings settle; in these cases, there is no formal 
hearing and no possibility of judicial review”) (footnote omitted).  
 50. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).  
 51. Id. at 838 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)). The Court set forth three rationales for 
rejecting judicial review over agency “[r]efusals to take enforcement steps.” Id. at 831. 
First, it reasoned that enforcement decisions require a “complicated balancing of a number 
of factors which are peculiarly within [an agency’s] expertise,” including an assessment of 
“whether a violation [actually] occurred,” the likelihood of success of an enforcement action, 
the overall resources available to an agency, as well as the “agency’s overall policies.” Id. 
Second, it contended “when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coer-
cive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon 
areas that courts often are called upon to protect.” Id. at 832. Third, it relied on a “tradi-
tion” of judicial deference over enforcement decisions, analogizing them to absolute prose-
cutorial discretion in the criminal context. Id. 
 52. Id. at 832-33, 833 n.4 (allowing that presumption might be rebutted where Con-
gress establishes “substantive priorities, or . . . circumscrib[es] an agency’s power to dis-
criminate among issues or cases it will pursue” or where an agency “ ‘consciously and ex-
pressly adopt[s] a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its 
statutory responsibilit[y]” (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 
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Political constraints to agency exercises of enforcement discretion 
are similarly weak.53 Neither Congress nor the public at large can 
discipline enforcement decisions unless they are made aware of them. 
Strategic exercises of enforcement discretion, however, may not be 
exposed unless accompanied by a guidance document. While Con-
gress sometimes requires agencies to report their enforcement ef-
forts, it generally does not mandate any particular level of specificity. 
As a result, statutory reporting requirements may fail to expose 
shifts in enforcement policy, precluding both Congress and the public 
from assessing existing enforcement policies, identifying gaps in en-
forcement, or exercising political pressure to shift priorities.  
Here, too, the White House has directed agencies to make en-
forcement data publicly available.54 Again, however, this commitment 
lacks any enforcement mechanism and is subject to rescission, ena-
bling presidential policies pursued through enforcement discretion to 
evade meaningful external constraint.  
C.   Circumvention Incentives  
The variability of external oversight across policymaking tools 
would appear to create incentives for politically motivated agencies to 
employ certain tools opportunistically to minimize constraints on ex-
ecutive discretion. Practical and doctrinal considerations, however, 
may counterbalance the incentives to evade more rigorous con-
straints,55 leaving the extent to which agencies actually engage in 
such opportunistic behavior a subject of debate. 
Current doctrine generally grants an agency the freedom to choose 
any policymaking tool in its arsenal to effectuate a given policy. Pur-
suant to SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), courts will not exercise 
judicial review over an agency’s decision to promulgate a new policy 
through an enforcement proceeding rather than rulemaking.56 By 
                                                                                                                       
1973))). See generally Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Adminis-
trative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008) (proposing a theoretical 
framework for understanding judicial review over agency inaction).  
 53. See Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing to Be Done: An Essay on 
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 253, 286-87 (2003) (noting that retail enforcement typically flies under 
public radar); see also Andrias, supra note 14, at 1063, 1083-90 (discussing absence of 
transparency in enforcement priority shifts).  
 54. Memorandum on Regulatory Compliance, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 1  
(Jan. 18, 2011), reprinted in 76 Fed. Reg. 3825, 3825 (Jan. 21, 2011) (explaining that 
“[g]reater disclosure of regulatory compliance information fosters fair and consistent en-
forcement . . . [and] is a critical step in encouraging the public to hold the Government and 
regulated entities accountable . . . provid[ing] Americans with information they need to 
make informed decisions”). 
 55. See infra Sections II.D.1, II.D.2. 
 56. 332 U.S. 194, 203, 207 (1947); see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron 
Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974). 
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contrast, an agency decision to announce a new policy through a 
guidance document rather than rulemaking is subject to judicial re-
view,57 but even here the considerable doctrinal confusion over the 
distinction between these policymaking forms grants agencies wide 
latitude to choose between the two.58 An agency seeking to implement 
a presidential policy preference thus may choose to do so by engaging 
in rulemaking, issuing a guidance document, or exercising its en-
forcement discretion, and courts generally do not second-guess  
that choice.   
A number of commentators have expressed concern that agencies 
will exercise this choice to circumvent the more onerous constraints 
associated with rulemaking, focusing in particular on the use of 
guidance documents. Observing “widespread” abuse in this area, 
former Chair of the Administrative Conference of the United States 
Robert Anthony states: 
Where an agency can nonlegislatively impose standards and ob-
ligations that as a practical matter are mandatory, it eases its 
work greatly in several undesirable ways. It escapes the delay and 
the challenge of allowing public participation in the development 
of its rule. It probably escapes the toil and the discipline of build-
ing a strong rulemaking record. It escapes the discipline of prepar-
ing a statement of the basis and purpose justifying the rule. It may 
also escape APA publication requirements and Office of Manage-
ment and Budget regulatory review. And if the agency can show 
that its informal document is not final or ripe, it will escape imme-
diate judicial review. Indeed, for practical reasons it may escape 
judicial review altogether.59  
Professor Mark Seidenfeld likewise suggests that agencies “ex-
ploit” policy statements to implement policies that likely would “suc-
cumb to political or legal opposition were [they] adopted using notice-
and-comment procedures.”60 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Mortgage Bankers Association v. Perez frankly acknowledges this 
                                                                                                                       
 57. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19 (5th Cir.  
Nov. 9, 2015) (finding substantial likelihood of success on merits of argument that Obama 
administration policy granting deferred action to undocumented immigrants does not con-
stitute policy statement exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking requirements be-
cause it “imposes rights and obligations” and does not leave room for agency discretion); 
General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 290 F.3d 377, 382, 385 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that agency may 
not issue informal Guidance Document to promulgate policy with “binding effect” but must 
instead undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking).  
 58. See Anthony, supra note 11, at 1359; Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 334-35.  
 59. Anthony, supra note 11, at 1317-18 (footnotes omitted); see also Mendelson, supra 
note 11, at 408 (“[B]y issuing a guidance document, an agency can obtain a rule-like effect 
while minimizing political oversight and avoiding the procedural discipline, public partici-
pation, and judicial accountability required by the APA.”).  
 60. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 343. 
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risk: “There may be times when an agency’s decision to issue an in-
terpretive rule, rather than a legislative rule, is driven primarily by a 
desire to skirt notice-and-comment provisions.”61   
Although most of the commentary in this area focuses on the use 
of guidance documents, it would appear that agency exercises of en-
forcement discretion present the greater risk of circumvention, as 
this policymaking tool potentially evades any external oversight. As 
long as an enforcement decision does not result in final adjudication, 
and most do not, it is unlikely to be scrutinized by the courts, Con-
gress, or the general public. While the use of policy guidance may 
weaken external constraints, the exercise of enforcement discretion 
potentially eliminates them altogether.  
A number of practical and doctrinal considerations, however, ar-
guably counterbalance an agency’s motivation to exercise its choice of 
policymaking tool in a manner that evades more rigorous oversight 
mechanisms.   
 1.   Practical Factors 
A number of practical factors may limit the extent to which presi-
dential goals are achieved through exercises of enforcement  
discretion.  
As suggested above, political operatives may lack the capacity to 
influence individual enforcement decisions. Individual enforcement 
decisions typically are made by street-level bureaucrats who are pro-
tected by civil service laws designed to insulate them from political 
manipulation.62 Without a guidance document, an agency’s political 
leadership may be unable to communicate a policy on how those deci-
sions should be made. Nor is it clear that agency leadership can con-
trol enforcement decisions by exercising ex post review over them, 
given the sheer volume of enforcement decisions.63 In fact, Professor 
Strauss has suggested that lower-level bureaucrats channel policy-
making through enforcement proceedings precisely to avoid political 
supervision.64  
                                                                                                                       
 61. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015); see also Texas v. United 
States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190 (5th Cir. Nov. 9, 2015) (rejecting Obama admin-
istration’s use of guidance document rather than notice-and-comment rulemaking to im-
plement deferred action policy).  
 62. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1482 
(1992) (“The usual interface between a member of the public and an agency does not in-
volve the agency head, but a relatively low-level member of staff[.]”). 
 63. See Andrias, supra note 14, at 1071 (noting that time and resource limitations 
preclude systemic political review over all significant enforcement decisions). 
 64. Peter L. Strauss, Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive 
Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law, 74 
COLUM. L. REV. 1231, 1253-54 (1974). 
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Yet one can readily imagine that in at least some cases, an agen-
cy’s political leadership is able to communicate policy preferences to 
street-level enforcement officers without a guidance document; it 
might issue a policy directive orally, for example.65 Moreover, it 
might exercise ex post control notwithstanding time and resource 
limitations by limiting its review to certain types of cases. It is worth 
noting in this respect that at least one study finds that exercises of 
agency enforcement discretion have been more susceptible to presi-
dential influence than guidance documents.66 
Even if political operatives have the capacity to influence individ-
ual enforcement decisions without guidance documents, commenta-
tors argue that other practical considerations, nonetheless, encourage 
them to use guidance documents to announce the policies pursued 
through exercises of enforcement discretion.67 Among these, the de-
sire to claim political credit for a policy decision may motivate such 
disclosure. Additionally, disclosure allows regulated entities to com-
ply before an investigation is initiated, thereby conserving agency 
resources, protecting against due process objections, and promoting 
positive relationships with regulated entities.68   
Whether these considerations ultimately lead to public disclosure 
of enforcement decisions is unclear. The desire to allow regulated en-
tities to conform prior to the initiation of an enforcement action en-
courages an agency to disclose new policies to regulated entities, but 
provides no incentives to disclose to regulatory beneficiaries or the 
general public. This informational asymmetry favors deregulatory 
initiatives because only regulated entities will mobilize political pres-
sure to challenge policy choices. Moreover, although agencies may be 
motivated to publicly disclose an enforcement policy in order to claim 
political credit for it, this dynamic may not apply to all enforcement 
policies. For a politically motivated policy made for the benefit of a 
small minority or faction, incentives for public disclosure disappear 
entirely. These are the very cases, of course, where the need for pub-
lic disclosure is greatest. 
                                                                                                                       
 65. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 1076 (“[T]he structure of adjudication allows 
adjudicators to operate fairly independently on matters that are within their purview, thus 
allocating authority down within the agency. But senior agency policymakers retain a fair 
amount of freedom to craft rules that remove matters from the purview of case-by-case 
adjudication.”). 
 66. Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 415-17 (2010) (conducting 
empirical study of decisionmaking by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission).  
 67. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 435-36 (contending that risk of “secret law” or 
nondisclosure of agency policies is overstated).  
 68. Id.  
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These competing practical considerations render the extent to 
which agencies rely on individual exercises of enforcement discretion 
to implement presidential policy goals an open question.  
 2.   Doctrinal Factors 
In addition to the practical considerations that might impede an 
agency’s capacity or willingness to exercise its enforcement discretion 
in pursuit of presidential policy goals, commentators have identified 
doctrinal considerations that might counterbalance the agency’s in-
centives to circumvent constraints in this manner.69 They argue that 
because only formalized decisions—such as those made pursuant to 
rulemaking and formal agency adjudication—are entitled to the 
“binding force of law”70 and Chevron deference,71 agencies will be in-
clined to engage in these forms of policymaking notwithstanding the 
costs associated with them. That is, while an agency might be tempt-
ed to rely on policy guidance or exercises of enforcement discretion to 
avoid the rigorous constraints on rulemaking, it might nonetheless 
submit to those constraints in order to legally bind regulated entities 
and obtain a more deferential standard of judicial review. Justice So-
tomayor’s opinion in the Mortgage Bankers case articulates this view. 
While acknowledging that non-formalized policies are comparatively 
easier to promulgate than rulemaking, she concludes “that conven-
ience comes at a price: Interpretive rules ‘do not have the force and 
effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the adjudicatory 
process.’ ”72 In these ways, a number of commentators argue that con-
cerns regarding administrative evasion of rulemaking protections  
are overblown.  
Others, however, suggest that neither the binding force of law 
nor a more deferential standard of review may suffice to outweigh 
the incentives to evade external oversight. An agency that is able 
to obtain voluntary compliance with its policy preferences has little 
                                                                                                                       
 69. Magill, supra note 7, at 1423; see also Raso, supra note 8 (evaluating empirical 
evidence suggesting agencies do not channel policies through policy guidance to evade con-
straints on discretion). 
 70. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001) (“It is fair to assume 
generally that Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it 
provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and 
deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of such force.”); see also Kristin E. 
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 511-13 (2013).  
 71. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 221, 234; see also Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 
(1944); Magill, supra note 7, at 1441 (“The Mead decision has been, and should be, read to 
force the agency to give something up—namely, Chevron deference—if it chooses to an-
nounce its interpretation of a statute or regulation through a guidance document.”).  
 72. Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1204 (2015) (citation omitted) 
(reversing D.C. Circuit’s Paralyzed Veterans doctrine, which required agencies to undergo 
rulemaking in order to change its interpretation of its own regulation).  
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need to legally bind regulated entities.73 It also benefits little from 
deferential judicial review unless it is likely to be challenged in  
litigation.74  
In these ways, existing scholarly accounts dispute the extent to 
which agencies rely on enforcement discretion to promote presiden-
tial policy goals.   
*** 
Agencies seeking to implement a presidential policy goal possess a 
range of policymaking tools at their disposal—including rulemaking, 
the issuance of guidance documents, and the strategic exercise of en-
forcement discretion—each of which is subject to varying degrees of 
external oversight. This variability creates incentives for an agency 
to advance policy goals—especially controversial ones—through par-
ticular policymaking tools to evade stronger checks on its discretion. 
While commentators have identified factors that might counterbal-
ance these incentives, the extent to which agencies actually engage in 
such opportunistic behavior remains an open empirical question. The 
next Part engages in this empirical inquiry, presenting a case study 
of the use of different policymaking tools at one agency—the De-
partment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights. 
III.   CASE STUDY OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
This Part presents a case study of policymaking in the Depart-
ment of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR). After introducing 
some of the more salient characteristics of this agency, it examines 
OCR’s use of different policymaking tools to pursue White House 
goals. The study finds that OCR rarely pursues the President’s agen-
da through rulemaking, frequently relying instead on guidance doc-
uments. More alarmingly, it suggests significant political influence 
over the agency’s exercise of enforcement discretion, generating poli-
cies that have evaded meaningful external oversight. This Part closes 
by considering the generalizability of these findings.   
                                                                                                                       
 73. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 407 (noting that regulated entities may prefer to 
comply with a non-mandatory policy where the cost of compliance is low but the sanctions 
for noncompliance are high or where they need to maintain a long-term relationship with 
the agency); see also Anthony, supra note 11, at 1327-30 (noting that many policies lacking 
legally binding effect have practically binding effect).  
 74. See Anthony, supra note 11, at 1316-17 (noting unlikelihood of legal challenge to 
agency policy where “the affected private parties cannot afford the cost or the delay of liti-
gation, or because for other practical reasons they must accept a needed agency approval or 
benefit on whatever terms the agency sets”); see also Mendelson, supra note 11, at 411-13, 
420-24; Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 364-72. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that 
the imposition of Skidmore standard of review rather than the more deferential Chevron 
standard has negligible results on the outcome of cases. See William N. Eskridge & Lauren 
E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Inter-
pretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1099 (2008).  
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A.   Overview of the Office for Civil Rights 
The Office for Civil Rights (OCR)75 initially was created to imple-
ment Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting recipients of 
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, 
color or national origin.76 Today, it is situated within the Department 
of Education77 and maintains primary responsibility for enforcing 
federal protections against discrimination—on the basis of not only 
race, ethnicity and national origin, but also sex and disability—
across our nation’s primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools.78 
With an annual operating budget of approximately $100 million and 
over 500 staff members across twelve regional offices,79 the im-
portance, breadth, and depth of OCR operations render this agency 
worthy of study in its own right.  
At the same time, the case study of OCR suggests broader lessons 
concerning presidential control over the administrative state more 
generally. First, like many agencies, OCR maintains an array of poli-
cymaking tools at its disposal. It engages in notice-and-comment 
rulemaking80 and issues guidance documents.81 It also possesses 
statutory authority to conduct administrative enforcement proceed-
ings.82 The breadth of policymaking tools available to OCR enables a 
comparative analysis of presidential influence across tools.  
Second, aspects of OCR’s institutional design are representative of 
a great number of agencies across the administrative state. Unlike 
independent agencies or those led by multi-member commissions, 
which are specifically designed to be insulated from presidential in-
fluence, OCR’s structure and composition adhere to the traditional 
model of federal administrative agencies. Firmly ensconced within 
the President’s executive branch hierarchy, OCR is located within  
                                                                                                                       
 75. 32 Fed. Reg. 15,190, 15,190 (Nov. 7, 1967) (establishing Office for Civil Rights 
within Department of Health, Education and Welfare, predecessor to the Department of 
Education).  
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 
(1964)).  
 77. In 1979, Congress reorganized the Department of Health, Education and Welfare 
to create a separate cabinet department for education. Department of Education Organiza-
tion Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668, 671 (1979) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3411 (2012)).  
 78. See provisions of the U.S. Code cited supra note 17 and accompanying text (listing 
statutes enforced by OCR). 
 79. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 8; 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 15, at 1.  
 80. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (delegating authority to “issu[e] rules, regulations, or 
orders of general applicability”).  
 81. See Magill, supra note 7, at 1390 & n.14 (describing inherent agency authority to 
issue policy guidance (first citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944); then citing 
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., 1 Administrative Law Treatise § 6.4 at 325 (Aspen, 4th ed. 2002))).  
 82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (delegating authority to conduct enforcement pro-
ceedings to terminate federal funds for noncompliance). 
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the Department of Education, requiring OCR leadership to report  
to a higher level within the executive branch: the Secretary for  
Education.  
Moreover, OCR leadership is subject to White House appointment. 
The Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights is nominated by the Presi-
dent with the advice and consent of the Senate and enjoys no protec-
tions from removal.83 The White House has exercised this appoint-
ment power to install ideological allies to lead the agency. For exam-
ple, President Clinton appointed Norma Cantu to the position, who 
had litigated school desegregation and funding inequities with the 
Mexican American Legal Defense Fund,84 while President Obama 
appointed Catherine Lhamon, who had litigated the landmark Wil-
liams v. California case challenging unequal access to school re-
sources while at the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern Cali-
fornia.85 President W. Bush, by contrast, appointed Gerald Reynolds, 
whose work with the Center for New Black Leadership and Center 
for Equal Opportunity made his opposition to race-conscious diversity 
policies and the disparate impact theory of liability well known.86  
At the same time, OCR’s large cadre of professional staff and at-
torneys, like most federal agency officials below the politically ap-
pointed leadership, are insulated from partisan pressures through 
civil service rules protecting them from being hired, fired, or pun-
ished on the basis of ideology or political affiliation.87 Staff at each of 
the twelve regional OCR enforcement offices enjoy such protections, 
                                                                                                                       
 83. 20 U.S.C. § 3412(b)(2) (2012). A series of senior agency positions serving below the 
Assistant Secretary at D.C. headquarters—eleven in total—likewise are subject to political 
appointment. The U.S. Government Printing Office publishes the “Plum Book” every four 
years, listing all administrative positions within the executive and legislative branches 
subject to political appointment. It explains, “The duties of many such positions may in-
volve advocacy of Administration policies and programs and the incumbents usually have a 
close and confidential working relationship with the agency head or other key officials.” H. 
COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 112TH CONG., POLICY AND SUPPORTING 
POSITIONS iii (Comm. Print 2012). 
 84. 139 CONG. REC. 10,351 (1993) (recording appointment of Norma V. Cantu). 
 85. 159 CONG. REC. S6261, S6263 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 2013) (confirming the nomination 
of Catherine Lhamon).  
 86. Nomination of Gerald A. Reynolds, of Missouri, to be Assistant Secretary for Civil 
Rights: Hearing Before Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 1 
(2002); see also Chinh Q. Le, Racially Integrated Education and the Role of the Federal 
Government, 88 N.C. L. REV. 725, 749 & n.152, 751 n.170 (2010) (discussing opposition by 
the civil rights community to nomination and eventual recess appointment of Reynolds). 
For three of the eight years of the W. Bush administration, no Assistant Secretary was 
appointed, leaving the agency without leadership. 
 87. 20 U.S.C. § 3413(c) (authorizing the Assistant Secretary to “select, appoint, and 
employ such officers and employees, including staff attorneys, as may be necessary to carry 
out the functions of the Office” but providing that they be subject to civil service protections 
of Title 5 governing appointments in competitive service, chapter 51, and subchapter III of 
chapter 53 relating to classification and General Schedule pay rates).  
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and there are no political appointees in these offices. In these ways, 
the central aspects of OCR’s leadership and staffing structure are 
representative of most federal agencies across the administrative state. 
Finally, OCR’s substantive charge—civil rights enforcement—
presents a particularly contentious issue politically. Accusations of 
presidential subversion of civil rights mandates are nearly as old as 
the civil rights statutes themselves. Leon Panetta, former head of 
OCR, claimed the Nixon administration dismissed him from this po-
sition for rigorously enforcing federal civil rights laws in contraven-
tion of the President’s political agenda.88 The Reagan administration 
similarly fell under critical fire for focusing exclusively on claims of 
intentional discrimination and rejecting more structural or systemat-
ic reforms.89 More recently, a series of reports accused the George W. 
Bush administration of manipulating civil rights enforcement for 
partisan ends.90 Targeting presidential interference with OCR in par-
ticular, Professor Lia Epperson argues that this “federal administra-
tive agency historically tasked with protecting civil rights, effectively 
subverted its enforcement power to help eliminate the very policies 
and programs that sought to achieve racial inclusion in public educa-
tion.”91 While the political salience of civil rights enforcement may 
distinguish OCR from agencies charged with enforcing less conten-
tious areas of the law, this salience ensures consistent White House 
involvement, thereby providing a valuable opportunity to evaluate 
                                                                                                                       
 88. See LEON E. PANETTA & PETER GALL, BRING US TOGETHER: THE NIXON TEAM AND 
THE CIVIL RIGHTS RETREAT 357 (1971) (recounting President Nixon’s hostility to civil rights 
enforcement and consequent removal of Panetta as the head of OCR). 
 89. See Drew S. Days, III, The Courts’ Response to the Reagan Civil Rights Agenda, 42 
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1008-13 (1989) (describing presidential civil rights agenda under 
Reagan administration); see also Le, supra note 86, at 742-44 (describing critiques of civil 
rights enforcement under Reagan administration); Lemos, supra note 66, at 404-17 (same).  
 90. See Changing Tides: Exploring the Current State of Civil Rights Enforcement 
Within the Department of Justice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil 
Rights, and Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 139-68 (2007); 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: INFORMATION ON 
EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION, HOUSING AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT, VOTING, AND SPECIAL 
LITIGATION SECTIONS’ ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS FROM FISCAL YEARS 2001 THROUGH 2007 
(2009), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1075.pdf; see also CITIZENS’ COMM’N ON CIVIL 
RIGHTS, THE EROSION OF RIGHTS: DECLINING CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION (William L. Taylor et al. eds., 2007); Goodwin Liu, The Bush Ad-
ministration and Civil Rights: Lessons Learned, 4 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 77, 
85 (2009) (criticizing DOJ under the W. Bush administration for “a worrisome erosion of 
institutional norms of impartiality, professionalism, and nonpartisanship in civil rights 
enforcement” and “a broader pattern of undue and, in some cases, unlawful political influ-
ence in civil rights matters”).  
 91. Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive Branch in 
Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 146, 166 (2008).  
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the external constraints on such influence. For these reasons, the 
case study of OCR offers important lessons for the larger administra-
tive state.    
B.   OCR’s Use of Different Policymaking Tools  
A comparative analysis of OCR’s use of different policymaking 
tools supports the scholarly concern that agencies channel controver-
sial presidential goals through guidance documents rather than 
rulemaking. It further suggests, however, that OCR implements sig-
nificant policy shifts through the exercise of enforcement discretion.   
 1.   Rulemaking  
OCR’s use of rulemaking to implement presidential goals has been 
exceedingly rare. In the past twenty-five years, the agency has prom-
ulgated new regulations to advance a presidential agenda only once.92 
In 2006, OCR under the Bush administration published final rules 
interpreting Title IX’s prohibition against sex discrimination to per-
mit the operation of single-sex schools and programs.93 In its notice of 
proposed rulemaking, the agency expressly tied the reform to the 
President’s school choice initiative, which sought to expand the types 
of educational opportunities available to students.94  
In light of the robust legal and political constraints on rulemak-
ing, one might ask why OCR would employ this policymaking tool at 
all. Although other factors such as the availability of the binding 
force of law and Chevron deference may have influenced the decision 
to pursue this policymaking form, it is worth noting that in this in-
stance, the agency had no choice but to engage in rulemaking  
because it sought to reverse a prior regulation, which expressly  
                                                                                                                       
 92. OCR amended or issued new regulations on two additional occasions over this 
time period, but these instances were spurred not by the White House, but rather by con-
gressional enactments. In 2000, OCR amended its regulations defining the term “program 
or activity” to conform to the definition mandated by the Civil Rights Restoration Act. 65 
Fed. Reg. 68,050, 68,050 (Nov. 13, 2000) (codified at 34 C.F.R. pts. 100, 104, 106, 110 
(2015)). Six years later, it promulgated new regulations to ensure equal access to public 
school facilities in response to congressional enactment of the Boy Scouts of America Equal 
Access Act in 2002. 67 Fed. Reg. 69,456, 69,456 (Nov. 15, 2002) (codified at 34  
C.F.R. §§ 108.1-.9 (2015)). Agencies have little choice but to engage in rulemaking under 
these circumstances. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1247 (“A new statute which requires 
implementation does not present a choice between rulemaking and other forms of policy 
formulation: rules are required, although they are not always speedily forthcoming.”).  
 93. 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,530 (Oct. 25, 2006) (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.34 (2015)). 
 94. 69 Fed. Reg. 11,276 (Mar. 9, 2004).  
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prohibited single-sex schools and programs.95 Had OCR been free to 
employ another policymaking tool, it is not at all clear that it would 
have chosen to engage in rulemaking.  
 2.   Guidance Documents 
OCR relies extensively on guidance documents to implement 
White House goals. Typically appearing in the form of a “Dear Col-
league Letter” (DCL) to recipients of federal funding,96 OCR has is-
sued more than fifty guidance documents over the past twenty-five 
years.97 For example, OCR implemented the Bush administration’s 
commitment to religious freedom by issuing a DCL stating it would 
use Title VI and Title IX, which address race- and sex-discrimination 
respectively, to “aggressively prosecute harassment of religious stu-
dents.”98 It promoted the Obama administration’s policy on racial eq-
uity by issuing DCLs announcing it would aggressively investigate 
schools exhibiting racial disparities in rates of discipline99 and alloca-
tion of resources.100  
                                                                                                                       
 95. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,128 (June 4, 1975) (prohibiting single-sex classes with limited 
exceptions for sex education, physical education, and similar classes); see Am. Mining 
Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting agen-
cies must undergo notice-and-comment rulemaking to amend or reverse prior regulations).  
 96. Other forms of policy guidance issued by OCR include “Guidance” documents and 
“Policy Updates.” See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF 
RACE TO ACHIEVE DIVERSITY AND AVOID RACIAL ISOLATION IN ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY SCHOOLS (2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-
201111.pdf; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 
(2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf; Office for Civil Rights, 
Policy Update on Schools’ Obligations Toward National Origin Minority Students with 
Limited-English Proficiency, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Sept. 27, 1991), http://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/lau1991.html.  
 97. OCR makes all policy guidance currently in effect available on its website. Office 
for Civil Rights, Reading Room, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/ 
list/ocr/frontpage/faq/readingroom.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2016).  
 98. Kenneth Marcus, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Office for Civil Rights, Title VI 
and Title IX Religious Discrimination in Schools and Colleges (Sept. 13, 2004), 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/religious-rights2004.html. By way of example, it 
cited a case in which a “white male undergraduate student was harassed by a professor for 
expressing conservative Christian views” on homosexuality. Id.  
 99. CATHERINE E. LHAMON & JOCELYN SAMUELS, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER: NONDISCRIMINATORY ADMINISTRATION OF SCHOOL DISCIPLINE (Jan. 8, 
2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201401-title-vi.pdf. The 
DCL characterizes as unlawful discrimination any discipline policy that has an adverse 
impact on students of a particular race unless the policy is “necessary to meet an important 
educational goal” and no “comparably effective alternative policies or practices that would 
meet the school’s stated educational goal with less of a burden or adverse impact.”  
Id. at 11.  
 100. CATHERINE E. LHAMON, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: 
RESOURCE COMPARABILITY (Oct. 1, 2014), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-resourcecomp-201410.pdf.  
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Perhaps most striking, both the Bush and Obama administrations 
used this policymaking tool to implement opposing positions on race-
conscious diversity policies. OCR under the Bush administration is-
sued policy guidance “strongly encourag[ing] the use of race-neutral 
methods for assigning students to . . . schools.”101 Only three years 
later, new leadership under the Obama administration withdrew 
that guidance and replaced it with a series of DCLs expressly endors-
ing the use of race-conscious policies to promote diversity.102 These 
examples demonstrate OCR’s reliance on guidance documents to fur-
ther politicized policy priorities.  
 3.   Exercises of Enforcement Discretion  
An analysis of OCR exercises of enforcement discretion suggests 
reliance on this tool to implement politicized policy initiatives as 
well. Although the vast majority of OCR investigations are initiated 
in response to an individual complaint filed with the agency,103 OCR 
also proactively launches broad-scale, system-wide “compliance re-
views,” designed to address “issues of strategic significance.”104 OCR 
distinguishes compliance reviews from individual complaint investi-
gations as follows: “Complaints often affect one or a small group of 
students, whereas compliance reviews target issues of discrimination 
that are acute, regional, national in scope, or are newly emerging. 
They are designed to affect significant change at the target institu-
tion and provide widely applicable solutions.”105  
                                                                                                                       
 101. STEPHANIE MONROE, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: 
ADDRESSING TITLE VI AND HOW OCR ASSESSES THE USE OF RACE IN ASSIGNING STUDENTS 
TO ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS (Aug. 28, 2008) (on file with author).  
 102. The current administration issued guidance documents endorsing race-conscious 
policies on no fewer than four occasions. RUSSLYNN ALI & THOMAS E. PEREZ, OFFICE FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201111.pdf (discussing the issuance of guidance documents 
by the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Department of Justice regarding the 
voluntary use of race in student assignment); JOCELYN SAMUELS, & CATHERINE E. 
LHAMON, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER: FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF 
TEXAS AT AUSTIN (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/ 
colleague-201309.pdf; CATHERINE E. LHAMON ET AL., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR 
COLLEAGUE LETTER (May 6, 2014) (discussing Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action and its implications for institutions of higher education and elementary schools and 
their use of methods to achieve diversity).  
 103. OCR investigates every individual complaint filed with it. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(b)-(c) 
(2015). The number of individual complaints filed with OCR per year varies considerably, 
ranging over the past ten years from a low of 5533 in 2005 to a high of 9989 in 2014. 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 8.   
 104. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 16, at 4. 
 105. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET 
REQUEST 11 (2015) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, BUDGET REQUEST], 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/budget/budget15/justifications/bb-ocr.pdf. 
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This analysis of OCR’s exercise of enforcement discretion relies on 
data obtained pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) re-
quest for documents relating to OCR compliance reviews.106 For each 
compliance review initiated by OCR, the FOIA response provided: a 
docket number, the name of the educational entity targeted for inves-
tigation; dates on which the review was initiated, resolved, and 
closed; a list of the specific issues investigated in the review; and a 
description of how each of these issues was resolved.107 A comparison 
of compliance reviews initiated and resolved during the eight years of 
the Bill Clinton administration and the eight years of the George W. 
Bush administration shows significant shifts in the exercise of en-
forcement discretion.  
First, these administrations differed drastically in the overall 
number of compliance reviews initiated, suggesting a difference in 
the aggressiveness of their systemic reform efforts. Table 1 sets forth 
these data. During the Clinton years, OCR initiated a total of 889 
compliance reviews, or an average of 111 per year. The Bush admin-
istration, by contrast, initiated only 311 compliance reviews over 
eight years, yielding an average of 39 per year. This difference cannot 
be attributed to the complexity of reviews initiated. On the contrary, 
each compliance review initiated during the Clinton administration 
investigated on average 6.3 discrete issues, as compared to an aver-
age of only 3.4 issues per review in the subsequent administration. 
Nor can the difference be attributed to changes in funding, as the av-
erage annual appropriation to OCR during the Bush administration 
was more than forty percent greater than for the Clinton administra-
tion.108 The disparity may, however, be due to differences in how  
the agency defines “compliance review.” OCR sometimes defines the 
term to encompass any systemic investigation, including those that 
                                                                                                                       
 106. The Freedom of Information Act request sought from the Department of Educa-
tion’s Office for Civil Rights all “[d]ocuments relating to proactive compliance reviews, in-
cluding resolution agreements, termination letters, and records of monitoring efforts from 
FY 1990 to present.” Freedom of Information Act Request to U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Feb. 25, 
2014) (on file with author). 
 107. Letter from Christie D. Swafford, United States Dep’t of Educ., Office of Mgmt., 
Privacy, Information, and Records Management Services, to author regarding FOIA Re-
quest No. 14-00765-F (July 14, 2014) (on file with author); Email from Robert M. Carey, 
U.S. Dep’t of Ed., Office for Civil Rights, to author regarding FOIA Request 14-00765-F, 
Excel Spreadsheet (Aug. 27, 2014) (on file with author).  
 108. The average annual appropriation to OCR under the Clinton administration was 
$60 million, while the average annual appropriation under the W. Bush administration 
was $86 million. The number of staff employed by OCR fell, however, from an annual aver-
age of 752 full-time equivalent employees during Clinton’s two terms to an annual average 
of 658 full-time equivalent employees during Bush’s two terms. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2003, at 2 (listing OCR budget requests, appropriations, and 
staffing levels from 1993 through 2003); OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 
2007-08, at 3 (listing OCR budget requests, appropriations, and staffing from 1997  
to 2008).  
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originally stemmed from an individual complaint.109 Other times, 
OCR appears to use the term narrowly to refer to systemic investiga-
tions only if they did not originate with an individual complaint.110  
More tellingly, the issues targeted in compliance reviews show 
significant shifts in policy priorities. Eighty-six percent (86%) of the 
compliance reviews initiated during the Clinton administration re-
lated to Title VI enforcement, investigating discrimination on the ba-
sis of race, color, or national origin, while only forty-five percent 
(45%) of the compliance reviews initiated during the Bush admin-
istration involved Title VI enforcement. By contrast, the Bush admin-
istration initiated far more compliance reviews to enforce protections 
against discrimination on the basis of disability than the preceding 
administration. Forty-five percent (45%) of compliance reviews initi-
ated under Bush investigated such issues, as compared to only eight 
percent (8%) under Clinton.    
 
Table 1 
Compliance Reviews Initiated 
 
Clinton  
Administration 
Bush  
Administration 
Total Number 889 311 
Race 86% (767) 45% (140) 
Sex 13% (120) 38% (118) 
Disability 8% (69) 46% (141) 
Note: A single compliance review may investigate multiple forms of 
discrimination, such as race- as well as sex-discrimination. Conse-
quently, the sum of reviews relating to race-, sex-, and disability-
discrimination exceeds the total number of compliance reviews. 
 
Data disaggregated by regional office provide further evidence of 
the politicization of enforcement discretion as set forth in Table 2. 
Regional offices are staffed exclusively with career officers who enjoy 
civil service protections. If individual enforcement decisions were not 
susceptible to political interference, one might expect variance across 
regional offices in light of the differing demographic makeup of each 
region, but consistency within each regional office through time. Yet 
the data, set forth in Table 2, indicate the precise opposite. Every 
single regional office during the Clinton administration initiated at 
                                                                                                                       
 109. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CASE PROCESSING MANUAL art. I, § 110(l), at 13 
(2015), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrcpm.pdf (providing that an indi-
vidual complaint may be treated as a compliance review where it involves systemic issues). 
 110. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16, at 44 
(noting that resolution agreements addressing systemic issues result from both compliance 
reviews and individual complaints).  
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least one compliance review to enforce Title VI protections relating to 
racial harassment, resource equity and comparability, or discipline, 
and ten of the twelve offices investigated these issues in at least ten 
distinct compliance reviews. The Bush administration, by contrast, 
rarely investigated these issues. Three of the twelve regional offices 
did not file a single compliance review involving these issues, and 
only one office investigated these issues in more than two compliance 
reviews.  
Rather, regional offices during the Bush administration priori-
tized the enforcement of Title IX procedural requirements. Every 
single regional office in this time period initiated at least one compli-
ance review involving Title IX enforcement related to grievance pro-
cedures, the designation of a responsible employee, or the dissemina-
tion of a sex-discrimination policy; and ten of the twelve offices initi-
ated five or more compliance reviews relating to such issues. During 
the preceding eight years, by contrast, three offices failed to initiate a 
single compliance review involving Title IX’s procedural require-
ments, and only two offices initiated more than two reviews investi-
gating such issues. The differences in issues investigated through 
time coupled with the consistency of issues across regional offices 
suggest that they are not the result of decisions by career staff.  
 
Table 2 
Compliance Reviews Initiated by Regional Office 
 Title VI: Racial  
harassment; Resource  
equity & comparability; 
Discipline 
Title IX: Grievance  
procedures; Designation of  
responsible employee;  
Dissemination of policy 
Region Clinton  Bush  Clinton  Bush  
1 13 1 4 12 
2 10 2 1 2 
3 6 0 1 7 
4 10 1 0 3 
5 15 1 1 5 
6 1 1 0 14 
7 17 0 0 11 
8 10 1 0 6 
9 28 0 0 7 
10 10 2 0 7 
11 23 1 1 5 
12 19 4 3 7 
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Perhaps most revealing, the data suggest significant policy shifts 
in the manner in which investigations are resolved. The vast majori-
ty of investigations are closed either because the agency determines 
there is insufficient evidence to warrant proceeding further or be-
cause it negotiates a resolution agreement to remedy the issue of 
concern.111 Because an administration is free to alter the legal and 
factual standards to justify further action for particular types of 
claims, high rates of insufficient evidence findings may reflect antip-
athy toward certain issues.112 Table 3 sets forth the data on the per-
centage of investigations that were closed due to insufficient evidence 
during the Clinton and Bush administrations. Of the total 5699 is-
sues investigated and resolved during the Clinton administration, 
only thirteen percent (13%) were found to have insufficient evidence; 
in the subsequent eight years, twenty-two percent (22%) of the 1128 
issues resolved were closed due to a finding of insufficient evidence.   
 
Table 3 
Findings of Insufficient Evidence 
 
Clinton  
Administration 
Bush  
Administration 
Enforcement investigations closed 
due to insufficient  evidence 
13% 22% 
Race investigations closed due to 
insufficient evidence 
11% 25% 
Sex investigations closed due to in-
sufficient evidence 
27% 16% 
Disabilities investigations closed 
due to insufficient  
evidence 
12% 27% 
 
These disparities become starker when the data are disaggregated 
by type of case. During the Bush administration, twenty-five percent 
(25%) of resolved Title VI investigations were closed because of a 
finding of insufficient evidence, more than twice the rate of such clo-
sures (11%) during the Clinton administration. Resolutions of disabil-
ity-discrimination investigations reflect a similar pattern, with the 
Bush administration finding insufficient evidence in twenty-seven 
                                                                                                                       
 111. See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CASE PROCESSING MANUAL art. III, § 303(a),  
at 21, § 304, at 22 (2015). OCR occasionally closes a compliance review on other grounds, 
such as when it refers the case to another agency or because private litigation is pending. 
Id. § 110(m), at 13. 
 112. A finding of insufficient evidence in any compliance review is noteworthy, as these 
reviews are initiated at the discretion of the agency, which presumably screens out merit-
less cases. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, OCR CASE PROCESSING MANUAL, art. III, § 303, at 21 
(2015) (reviewing the consequences of an insufficient evidence determination). 
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percent (27%) of these cases, as compared to only twelve percent 
(12%) during the Clinton administration. The resolution of investiga-
tions to enforce sex-discrimination protections exhibit the opposite 
trend: the Clinton administration closed more than a quarter of its 
Title IX investigations because of insufficient evidence, as compared 
to only sixteen percent (16%) during the subsequent administration. 
Contrary to suggestions that individual enforcement decisions are too 
far removed from an agency’s political leadership to be subject to 
presidential control,113 these data indicate significant shifts in the 
initiation and resolution of compliance reviews.114  
C.   The Operation of Constraints on OCR Policymaking 
The evidence of OCR policymaking supports the contention that 
agencies implement contentious policy initiatives through guidance 
documents to evade the more onerous constraints imposed on rule-
making. More alarmingly, however, it also shows that agencies cir-
cumvent even the modest checks on guidance documents by channel-
ing policy initiatives through the strategic exercise of enforcement 
discretion.  
Although OCR guidance documents have avoided the extensive 
constraints imposed on rulemaking, this policymaking tool nonethe-
less has remained subject to some degree of oversight. While courts 
have declined to exercise legal checks on OCR guidance documents,115 
OCR’s practice of publicly disclosing guidance documents has enabled 
both Congress and the public at large to exercise political constraints. 
For example, when OCR issued a guidance document interpreting 
Title VI to permit colleges and universities to grant minority scholar-
ships,116 Congress mobilized pressure on the agency by requesting 
that the General Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a review of the 
policy; this political pressure ultimately resulted in the agency agree-
ing to “defer” its policy decision.117 Similarly, the public has played a 
role in disciplining policies announced through OCR guidance docu-
                                                                                                                       
 113. See Mendelson, supra note 11, at 435 (arguing that the threat of “hidden law”  
is overstated).  
 114. Political scientists have documented similar shifts in other agency enforcement 
contexts following changes in political leadership. B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, 
BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 73 (1994). 
 115. See, e.g., Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 944-45 
(D.C. Cir. 2004) (rejecting on standing grounds challenge to OCR guidance document an-
nouncing new standard for Title IX compliance in university athletic programs); Wash. 
Legal Found. v. Alexander, 984 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (denying judicial review pursuant 
to Administrative Procedure Act over challenge to OCR guidance document announcing 
policy on minority scholarships).  
 116. OCR’s shifting policies with respect to minority scholarships are described in 
Washington Legal Foundation, 984 F.2d at 485.  
 117. Id.  
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ments. Public criticism of the Obama administration’s guidance doc-
ument announcing a new standard universities should use in investi-
gating allegations of sexual violence, which appeared in mainstream 
news outlets including the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post, 
and the Atlantic Monthly, has imposed a heavy political cost on this 
policy decision.118 In these ways, OCR’s pursuit of presidential policy 
goals through the issuance of guidance documents has been subject to 
some degree of political oversight.  
OCR has succeeded in avoiding these modest checks, however, by 
implementing policy goals through the exercise of enforcement dis-
cretion. Courts have exercised no legal checks on OCR’s use of this 
policymaking tool. OCR enforcement proceedings do not usually re-
sult in settlement, but rather they always do. In the period for which 
data were available, OCR issued a letter of impending enforcement 
action in a compliance review on only two occasions and, in both cas-
es, reached a voluntary resolution before initiating formal agency ad-
judication. Consequently, there has not been a single instance over 
the past quarter century in which an enforcement decision resulted 
in the final agency action necessary for judicial review.119  
Additionally, Congress has played a minimal role in disciplining 
OCR’s enforcement decisions, convening only four oversight hearings 
to evaluate OCR enforcement efforts since 1990. Of these, only the 
first raised a concern about under-enforcement.120 The second hearing 
related to OCR’s handling of a single complaint of sexual harass-
ment,121 while the last two examined concerns regarding  
over-enforcement.122 
                                                                                                                       
 118. See, e.g., Peter Berkowitz, College Rape Accusations and the Presumption of  
Male Guilt, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10001424053111903596904576516232905230642; Opinion, The Feds’ Mad Assault on 
Campus Sex, N.Y. POST (July 20, 2011), http://nypost.com/2011/07/20/the-feds-mad-assault-
on-campus-sex/; Wendy Kaminer, The Save Act: Trading Liberty for Security on Campus, 
THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 25, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/04/the-
save-act-trading-liberty-for-security-on-campus/237833/; Letter from Gregory F. Sholtz, 
Assoc. Sec’y & Dir., Dep’t of Acad. Freedom, Tenure, & Governance, to Russlynn Ali, Assis-
tant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office of Civil Rights, (June 27, 2011), http://www.nacua.org/ 
documents/AAUPLetterToOCRReSexualViolenceEvidence.pdf (responding to the Dear 
Colleague Letter dated Apr. 4, 2011).  
 119. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
 120. Oversight Hearing: Office for Civil Rights, Department of Education Before the S. 
Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 102d Cong. 3-4 (1991) (addressing concerns of OCR’s un-
der-enforcement of Title VI with respect to ability grouping). 
 121. Oversight Hearing on the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Before the 
Subcomm. on Select Educ. & Civil Rights of the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 103d Cong. 
136-42, 162-64 (1994) (discussing OCR investigation of a single allegation of sexual har-
assment at Moorhead State University). 
 122. Hearing on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Before the Subcomm. on 
Postsecondary Educ., Training & Life-Long Learning of the H. Comm. on Econ. & Educ. 
Opportunities, 104th Cong. 26 (1995) (assessing whether over-enforcement of sex discrimi-
nation in college athletics was “tearing down men’s sports”); see The Review and Oversight 
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Finally, the limited disclosure of OCR enforcement decisions has 
precluded the public’s ability to exercise meaningful checks on them. 
Pursuant to congressional requirements, OCR periodically issues re-
ports summarizing its compliance and enforcement activities.123 Alt-
hough not statutorily required to provide any particular level of spec-
ificity, these reports do disclose information including the total num-
ber of compliance reviews initiated each year and some of the major 
issues targeted in such reviews. Yet, because this information is nei-
ther exhaustive nor statutorily mandated, it is conceivable that en-
forcement decisions vulnerable to public reprisal are excised from 
these reports. Moreover, these reports omit any indication of issues 
that were not pursued, either because they were closed due to insuffi-
cient evidence or because they were not initiated in the first in-
stance.124 These information gaps limit the public’s ability to hold the 
agency accountable for shifts in enforcement policy.   
Of course, further specificity may be disclosed in the manner in 
which the data for this study were obtained—a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request. Even this mechanism is limited, however, as it 
fails to provide crucial details regarding the conduct of investiga-
tions, the level of evidence necessary to proceed with an investiga-
tion, or the content and ongoing monitoring of resolution agreements 
reached. As a result, the agency is free to institute only cosmetic in-
terventions such as the posting of anti-discrimination policies rather 
than more extensive remedial measures, all without public scrutiny.125  
Importantly, the current administration has taken steps to im-
prove the transparency of enforcement decisions. OCR now publishes 
a list of institutions under investigation and has made publicly avail-
able all resolution agreements entered since 2014.126 While OCR 
                                                                                                                       
of the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, 106th Cong. 
(1999) (addressing concerns about over-enforcement, particularly on the areas of athletics, 
English language learners, and standardized testing).  
 123. 20 U.S.C. § 3413(b)(1) (2012). Notably, although OCR is statutorily required to 
make these reports annually, it has issued only three reports over the past seven years. See 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
FISCAL YEARS 2007-08 (2009) [hereinafter OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 
2007-08], http://www2.ed.gov/about/reports/annual/ocr/annrpt2007-08/annrpt2007-08.pdf; 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 16; OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16.  
 124. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2007-08, supra note 123; 
OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2009-12, supra note 17; OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 16. 
 125. See Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law 
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1016 (2004) (endorsing model of “experimentalist 
regulation” in favor of traditional command-and-control remedies to restructure public 
institutions). 
 126. Office for Civil Rights, Recent Resolutions, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/investigations/index.html?exp=2 (last visited 
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should be applauded for these efforts, the lack of a mechanism for 
enforcement and the possibility of future rescission limit the useful-
ness of such self-imposed constraints.  
The evidence suggests not only that OCR has exercised its en-
forcement discretion in furtherance of partisan policy goals, but also 
that in doing so, it has avoided even the modest constraints associat-
ed with guidance documents.    
D.   Generalizing from OCR’s Choice of Policymaking Form 
OCR’s policymaking record suggests that competing practical and 
doctrinal considerations fail to counterbalance the agency’s incen-
tives to employ particular policymaking forms to minimize constraints  
on executive discretion. Several factors likely account for this dynam-
ic, providing important clues as to the generalizability of these  
findings.  
First, the OCR case study suggests that an agency’s political lead-
ership is both willing and able to exercise control over individual en-
forcement decisions. That is, exercises of enforcement discretion are 
not immune from political influence, even absent a guidance docu-
ment directing the conduct of lower-level enforcement officers. Im-
portantly, however, the case study focuses on compliance reviews, 
which are sufficiently limited in number to allow political operatives 
to exercise review over each and every decision. Enforcement deci-
sions over individual complaints, which number in the thousands 
annually, may be less susceptible to presidential control. Yet the lack 
of information regarding individual complaint investigations leaves 
open the possibility that these decisions are subject to political influ-
ence as well. In any case, even without control over more individual 
complaints, which tend to be of limited practical impact, the ability to 
influence systemic investigations provides a powerful tool to achieve 
presidential policy goals without legal or political accountability.     
Second, the evidence suggests that the binding force of law does 
not suffice to counteract the incentives to circumvent the rigorous 
checks on rulemaking. Three factors likely allow OCR to rely on non-
formalized policymaking tools notwithstanding their lack of binding 
effect: the nature of the entities regulated, the normative weight of 
the agency’s enforcement mission, and the types of sanctions availa-
ble to the agency.   
                                                                                                                       
Feb. 27, 2016); see also OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ANNUAL REPORT FY 2013-14, supra note 
16, at 5 (“To boost transparency, OCR instituted a new policy of publicizing lists of schools 
under investigation by OCR, including a list of colleges subject to pending sexual violence 
cases, and of uploading nearly every resolution agreement and letter reached during FY 
2014 and beyond onto its website.”). 
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The entities regulated by OCR are unlikely to resist even non-
binding OCR policy. The costs of compliance for public K-12 schools 
in particular are low. Overseen by popularly elected school boards 
and their delegates, their compliance decisions ultimately are politi-
cal decisions, and the ability to deflect responsibility onto the federal 
government reduces the political liability that might otherwise be 
imposed on a decision to comply. In addition, entities regulated by 
OCR are not driven by profit; while a business entity is likely to chal-
lenge an enforcement decision when the costs of compliance outweigh 
the risk of losing the challenge, the nonprofit and government insti-
tutions regulated by OCR do not face such financial incentives.   
Moreover, civil rights agencies like OCR arguably carry more 
normative sway than other regulatory agencies, increasing the likeli-
hood of voluntary compliance with its policies. Regulated entities 
may be particularly averse to media attention that could result from 
visible resistance to a federal civil rights agency. Agencies that regu-
late in more technical fields or those that regulate entities that do 
not depend on end-use consumers may face more resistance to policy 
impositions.   
The nature of the sanctions available to OCR may also encourage 
regulated entities to comply with non-binding policy decisions. The 
potential sanctions for non-compliance of OCR policies are entirely 
binary; the agency either grants or denies all federal funding. The 
risk of a total loss of federal financial support, even if remote, creates 
powerful incentives to comply. Regulated entities facing the risk of 
more calibrated sanctions, by contrast, may have less to lose in chal-
lenging an agency’s decision.  
These factors eliminate any real cost to OCR’s circumvention of 
checks on presidential power by relying on non-formalized policymak-
ing tools. Even without the binding force of law, OCR’s exercises of 
enforcement discretion and guidance documents produce significant 
regulatory effects on the ground. Although not all agencies will enjoy 
this luxury, those that share these characteristics with OCR have 
few incentives to expose themselves to the rigorous external checks  
of rulemaking.   
***  
The absence of meaningful checks on OCR’s exercise of enforce-
ment discretion raises considerable normative concerns. First, it ena-
bles the President to direct agency enforcement in contravention of 
congressional intent or in abdication of statutory duties. Second, it 
permits policies to be developed without careful deliberation or public 
input. Third, the absence of transparency allows OCR to impose poli-
cies without political opposition. Finally, naked partisan preferences 
may override the neutral judgment and expertise of career enforce-
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ment officers. These normative concerns necessitate reforms to 
strengthen checks on agency exercises of enforcement discretion in 
pursuit of presidential policies. The next Part explores the potential 
for such reforms.  
IV.   STRENGTHENING CHECKS ON ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION 
This Part explores potential reforms to temper presidentially mo-
tivated enforcement decisions. It begins by evaluating strategies to 
strengthen the role of external institutions to constrain agency en-
forcement discretion. Concluding that such reforms would be insuffi-
cient, it turns to the possibilities for enhancing internal constraints. 
Focusing on structures and processes within the agency itself, it pro-
poses harnessing the civil service bureaucracy and its relationships 
with external institutions to discipline presidential power.   
A.   Legal Constraints 
One strategy to constrain politicized enforcement decisions would 
be to strengthen legal checks on them. Such a reform might proceed 
in one of two ways. First, courts could doctrinally restrict the agen-
cy’s ability to promulgate policies through enforcement proceedings 
rather than through alternative policymaking tools. Alternatively, 
they might exercise substantive review over enforcement decisions. 
Neither avenue is likely to find favor, however, and for good reason.   
The first strategy would weaken doctrinal protection over the 
agency’s choice of policymaking tool. A number of commentators have 
endorsed this approach to limit an agency’s ability to choose between 
rulemaking and guidance documents. Professor Bressman, for exam-
ple, would require agencies to provide a reasoned explanation for a 
decision to implement a policy through a guidance document in lieu 
of rulemaking, while Professor Watts argues for a clearer doctrinal 
distinction between policies that may be implemented through guid-
ance documents and those that must undergo rulemaking.127 The case 
study suggests, however, that such reforms would be counterproduc-
tive, simply channeling more decisions from guidance documents, 
which are subject to modest constraints, to enforcement discretion, 
which is subject to no meaningful oversight.  
To avoid this result, this strategy would need to restrict an agen-
cy’s ability to promote new policies through the exercise of enforce-
ment discretion. Few, however, seriously advocate reversing Chenery 
                                                                                                                       
 127. See Bressman, supra note 2, at 553 (endorsing requirement that agencies provide 
reasoned explanation for decision to implement policy through policy guidance rather than 
rulemaking); Watts, supra note 1, at 78 (urging development of clearer doctrinal distinction 
between legislative rules and nonlegislative rules to limit agencies’ ability to impose new 
policies through policy guidance rather than through rulemaking). 
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II to restrict an agency’s ability to impose new policies through exer-
cises of enforcement discretion rather than either rulemaking or poli-
cy guidance. The reason is clear: any effort to distinguish when a giv-
en enforcement decision imposes new policy is destined to fail. As 
Professor Strauss notes, “Even with the most comprehensive ‘legisla-
tive’ scheme, judicial application inevitably ‘makes’ new law.”128 Con-
sequently, “[t]he search for mandatory controls over the allocation of 
the policymaking function between rulemaking and adjudication  
remains illusory.”129  
Rather than restrict the agency’s choice of policymaking form, the 
second strategy would allow substantive judicial review over the en-
forcement decisions themselves. Reforms to ripeness and finality doc-
trines would enable courts to review an enforcement decision before 
an adjudicatory finding of noncompliance is entered.130 But even if 
doctrinal reforms made judicial review available, the targets of en-
forcement proceedings would be unlikely to take advantage of it. 
Regulated entities that are likely to voluntarily comply with OCR’s 
non-binding policy preferences are equally unlikely to legally chal-
lenge those preferences.131 The ability to shift political blame for 
compliance, lack of a profit motive, aversion to negative media atten-
tion, and risk of losing all federal funding make it exceedingly unlike-
ly that the target of a compliance review would file suit against OCR 
rather than comply with its requests. 
Others have argued for abandoning the Heckler doctrine to allow 
judicial review over non-enforcement decisions.132 This reform would 
empower regulatory beneficiaries to legally challenge enforcement 
decisions. Like most agencies, however, OCR lacks the resources to 
investigate every potential violation of law and must engage in a 
“complicated balancing . . . of factors” to allocate these scarce re-
sources.133 Courts do not have the institutional competence, lacking 
both political accountability as well as bureaucratic expertise, to de-
termine whether X percent of OCR enforcement efforts should be de-
                                                                                                                       
 128. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1265; see also Andrias, supra note 14, at 1101 
(“[T]he line between individual enforcement actions and enforcement policy is not always 
so clear . . . .”).  
 129. See Strauss, supra note 64, at 1274.  
 130. Cf. Seidenfeld, supra note 11, at 384-85 (endorsing reforms to ripeness and finality 
doctrines to strengthen judicial review over policy guidance).  
 131. See supra Section III.D (discussing such factors).  
 132. See, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administra-
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REV. 1657, 1667-68 (2004); Cheh, supra note 53, at 279-88; Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing 
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 133. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985); see also Price, supra note 14, at 748; 
Sunstein, supra note 132, at 682. 
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voted to race discrimination claims, for example, while Y percent 
should be devoted to disability claims. Additionally, as Jeffrey Love 
and Arpit Garg point out, an agency can always defend its failure to 
investigate by claiming simply that it has not done so yet.134 For these 
reasons, proposals to strengthen legal constraints to exercises of 
agency enforcement discretion are neither practicable nor advisable.   
B.   Political Constraints  
Rather than relying on legal constraints to discipline agencies’ ex-
ercise of enforcement discretion, another reform strategy might focus 
on political constraints. Congress could enhance its own ability and 
that of the public to discipline enforcement decisions by narrowing 
the scope of the agency’s discretion135 or by requiring more transpar-
ency in the agency’s exercise of this discretion.136   
To discipline presidential control over agency enforcement deci-
sions, Congress might statutorily restrict the scope of an agency’s 
enforcement discretion by, for example, earmarking funds for partic-
ular enforcement activities. This approach would need to overcome 
the veto-gates of the legislative process,137 which may be particularly 
difficult for agencies like OCR, whose constituencies include diffuse 
regulatory beneficiaries lacking deep pockets. More importantly, even 
if legislative reforms in this area were achievable, they may not re-
sult in better policies. Legislative specificity denies agencies the flex-
ibility to respond to new challenges in a changing environment. It 
also may undermine the judgment of career enforcement officials, 
who accumulate expertise in identifying forms of discrimination most 
damaging to educational achievement and the types of remedies most 
effective in combating discrimination in schools.138   
Instead of narrowing the scope of OCR’s enforcement discretion, 
Congress could strengthen political checks by requiring more trans-
                                                                                                                       
 134. Love & Garg, supra note 14, at 1228. 
 135. See id. at 1245 (endorsing such reform).  
 136. See Andrias, supra note 14, at 1036 (advocating increased transparency of en-
forcement policy).  
 137. Cf. Kagan, supra note 1, at 2339 (noting that the President can achieve policy 
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parency.139 As described above, OCR has taken important steps to-
ward this goal by making publicly available a list of all institutions it 
is investigating and all resolution agreements it has reached since 
2014.140 Congress should applaud this effort and require future ad-
ministrations to maintain this policy. Additionally, it should require 
more detailed data to be included in OCR’s annual reports, including 
the steps taken to investigate cases, the number and types of cases 
closed due to insufficient evidence, the legal and factual standards 
used to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to proceed 
with further action, and the steps taken to monitor resolution agree-
ments after they are entered. These data would enable Congress and 
the public at large to identify shifts in enforcement policy and hold 
the administration accountable for them.  
While political checks in the form of transparency requirements 
are important, they fail to address all of the concerns raised by exer-
cises of enforcement discretion.141 Exclusive reliance on public pres-
sure to discipline civil rights enforcement is particularly inapt given 
that the regulatory regime in this area was created precisely to pro-
tect minority interests from majoritarian will.142 Additional mecha-
nisms are necessary to ensure that public preferences do not under-
mine other regulatory norms of fairness, effectiveness, and efficien-
cy.143 For such mechanisms, we must shift our attention to the inter-
nal workings of the agency.   
C.   Structural Reforms  
The limitations to legal and political approaches to disciplining po-
liticized enforcement decisions counsel for a turn inward, to explore 
the relationship between structures and processes of the agency on 
the one hand, and effective enforcement on the other.144 The Adminis-
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trative Conference of the United States (ACUS) describes the im-
portance of these aspects of agency design as follows:  
[T]he structures of federal agencies, from their location to fea-
tures of their internal design and reporting requirements, partly 
determine who has influence over non-statutory policy decisions 
and how well federal agencies perform in carrying out statutorily 
mandated responsibilities. . . . Agency structure determines who 
gets to make decisions and how well those decisions will be imple-
mented. It determines whether agencies will be responsive to the 
White House, Congress, or key groups and who has access to  
decisionmakers.145 
At least three distinct proposals suggest themselves: changing the 
leadership structure of OCR; encouraging inter-agency competition; 
and amending procedures for initiating, investigating, and resolving 
compliance reviews. It concludes that while the first two proposals 
are likely to be of limited effectiveness, the third approach offers a 
powerful check on politicized enforcement decisions.  
The first structural approach to disciplining presidential control 
over enforcement decisions focuses on agency leadership. Currently, 
OCR leadership is vested in a single presidential appointee, who en-
joys no protections from removal. An alternative leadership structure 
arguably would be less likely to bend to the President’s policy prefer-
ences. Yet the records of two other civil rights agencies suggest that 
attempts to insulate agency leadership from presidential pressure by 
altering the structure of leadership may be ineffective or even  
counterproductive.   
By statute, leadership over the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC)—responsible for investigating and resolving al-
legations of employment discrimination—is vested in a five-member 
bipartisan body. No more than three Commissioners may be mem-
bers of the same political party, and each member’s five-year term 
protects him or her from politically motivated removal.146 Yet, EEOC 
enforcement decisions have remained subject to considerable presi-
dential influence despite this leadership structure. Margaret Lemos’ 
empirical study of the EEOC finds that although partisan influence 
over the agency’s policy guidance has been limited, its enforcement 
decisions have been subject to considerable political control. In par-
ticular, she notes that once the majority of Commissioners were Re-
publican, the Reagan administration succeeded in shifting EEOC en-
forcement policy away from more subtle and systemic forms of dis-
crimination to focus instead on individual complaints of intentional 
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discrimination.147 This record suggests that a bipartisan committee 
structure may not be particularly effective in protecting enforcement 
decisions from presidential influence.   
The enforcement record of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 
(USCCR)—charged with monitoring federal enforcement of civil 
rights laws—suggests that a leadership structure designed to be in-
sulated from presidential influence may not only be ineffective, but 
indeed may counterproductively result in systematic non-
enforcement. Like the EEOC, the USCCR is led by a multi-member 
commission, where each Commissioner is protected from politicized 
removal.148 Unlike the EEOC, however, the USCCR consists of eight 
Commissioners, no more than four of whom may be members of the 
same political party.149 While this structure may safeguard the 
USCCR from presidential influence, it also has resulted in policy pa-
ralysis due to partisan gridlock. For example, when USCCR career 
staff drafted a report critiquing civil rights enforcement during the 
Bush administration,150 Commissioners voted along party lines to bar 
its publication.151 Similar problems of partisan gridlock have plagued 
the Commission for decades, undermining the agency’s continued 
credibility and relevance.152 In this case, the attempt to insulate 
agency leadership from presidential control has resulted in less en-
forcement altogether.   
A second structural strategy to discipline presidential influence 
over enforcement decisions would grant overlapping jurisdiction to 
multiple agencies to generate inter-agency conflict and competition. 
Professor Neal Katyal argues: “Just as the standard separation-of-
powers paradigms (legislature v. courts, executive v. courts, legisla-
ture v. executive) overlap to produce friction, so too do their internal 
variants. When the State and Defense Departments have to convince 
each other of why their view is right, for example, better decision-
making results.”153 Again, however, the existing records suggest the 
weakness of this strategy: OCR already shares overlapping jurisdic-
tion with two competing agencies, yet neither has imposed a mean-
ingful check on OCR enforcement decisions.  
                                                                                                                       
 147. Lemos, supra note 66, at 416.  
 148. 42 U.S.C. § 1975(a). The President may remove a member only for “neglect of duty 
or malfeasance in office,” not on ideological grounds. Id. § 1975(e). 
 149. Id. § 1975(b).  
 150. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REDEFINING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
RECORD OF THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 2001-2004 (Draft Report Sept. 2004), 
http://health-equity.pitt.edu/57/.  
 151. For an account of the politics relating to the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, see 
Le, supra note 86, at 754-57. 
 152. See id. at 743-47. 
 153. Katyal, supra note 18, at 2317.  
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OCR shares jurisdiction over the enforcement of anti-
discrimination laws in educational institutions with the Department 
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division. Theoretically, the risk that the Civ-
il Rights Division will initiate an enforcement proceeding against an 
entity after OCR declines to do so tempers OCR’s exercise of en-
forcement discretion. A series of reports documenting politicized deci-
sion-making within the Civil Rights Division, however, suggests this 
agency is at least as vulnerable to partisan manipulation as OCR.154 
This finding should come as no surprise: like OCR, the Civil Rights 
Division is led by a single presidential appointee with no protections 
from removal. As such, its enforcement decisions are subject to the 
same political pressures as OCR.155  
The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights also theoretically disciplines 
OCR enforcement decisions.156 The fear of public criticism by USCCR 
arguably deters OCR from straying too far from its mission. Yet, as 
suggested above, partisan gridlock has precluded USCCR from im-
posing a meaningful check on sister agencies. The refusal to publish 
the report criticizing civil rights enforcement under the Bush admin-
istration exemplifies this impotence.157 Neither the Civil Rights Divi-
sion nor the USCCR appears to have played a meaningful role in dis-
ciplining OCR enforcement decisions.   
A third structural strategy, focusing on the civil service bureau-
cracy and its relationships with external actors, holds more prom-
ise.158 One approach to insulating enforcement decisions from politici-
zation would be to shift the authority to make these decisions to ca-
reer enforcement officers. Yet this approach raises its own prob-
lems—compromising rule of law norms of uniformity and consistency 
while at the same time precluding any form of public accountability. 
Instead, OCR procedures should be amended to require the civil ser-
vice attorneys and investigators within the agency to develop and 
make publicly available written recommendations for each decision 
relating to the initiation, investigation, resolution, and monitoring of 
compliance reviews, while allowing the agency’s political leadership 
                                                                                                                       
 154. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED 
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to reject those recommendations. The bureaucratic recommendations 
would provide crucial information to allow Congress and the public to 
assess the administration’s policy choices, thereby empowering the 
civil service while at the same time strengthening its relationship 
with external institutions of constraint. It would also provide valua-
ble information to courts—in the rare event that a challenge were 
litigated—and might result in reduced judicial deference to adminis-
trative decisions departing from professional recommendation. More-
over, this mechanism is unlikely to impose meaningful drag on poli-
cymaking because career officials likely develop written recommen-
dations already but simply do not make them publicly available. 
In fact, this very mechanism led to public scrutiny over the Bush 
Administration’s approval of pre-clearance submissions under the 
Voting Rights Act. As Goodwin Liu documents, DOJ maintains an 
institutional tradition in which career staff, who investigate pre-
clearance submissions, provide a written memorandum to the politi-
cal leadership with their recommendation; the political leadership 
then is free to accept or reject the recommendation.159 News organiza-
tions obtained copies of these memoranda pursuant to a Freedom of 
Information Act request. These documents revealed the leadership’s 
rejection of staff recommendations, generating significant public crit-
icism of politicized enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.160 Effective 
constraints on politicized enforcement decisions are too important to 
leave to institutional tradition within a single agency. Rather, this 
practice should be mandated across agencies and enforced externally. 
Congress could require staff to develop written recommendations and 
publicly disclose them either through a straightforward mandate or 
conditional funding. Courts might encourage the development and 
disclosure of staff recommendations by calibrating the deference to 
which they afford such decisions.  
Additionally, OCR procedures should be amended to formally re-
quire career staff to confer with regulatory beneficiaries. Current 
procedures for the conduct of compliance reviews contemplate con-
stant interaction between the agency and the regulated entity, but no 
role at all for regulatory beneficiaries.161 To ensure that enforcement 
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decisions benefit from the input of not only regulated entities but also 
regulatory beneficiaries, the compliance review process should pro-
vide an explicit role for them. At the outset of each compliance re-
view, OCR should be required to identify the intended beneficiaries 
and convene a group to represent those beneficiaries. It should re-
quire periodic consultation with this group during the course of in-
vestigation and participation of the group in negotiating any resolu-
tion agreement. The beneficiary group should also play a role in sub-
sequent monitoring of compliance with the resolution agreement. 
These reforms will not only empower regulatory beneficiaries, but 
also empower career staff, providing them with allies to resist politi-
cal pressures in individual cases.   
Whatever the precise course of reform, the ultimate goal of provid-
ing some check to presidential control over enforcement decisions 
warrants more examination and study. While presidential control 
may have salutary benefits to the development of agency policy, the 
expertise of career staff and public accountability need not be sacri-
ficed to achieve these benefits.162  
V.   CONCLUSION 
The rise in presidential administration raises a host of thorny 
questions regarding the appropriate role for the President, Congress, 
and the courts in the modern administrative state. Even the most 
ardent champions of presidential control agree that such control 
must be subject to a system of checks and balances. Notwithstanding 
this consensus, the OCR case study suggests that presidential policy 
preferences may be implemented through agencies’ strategic exercise 
of enforcement discretion with virtually no external oversight at all. 
The absence of any constraint on administrative enforcement discre-
tion renders this tool a particularly attractive means for achieving 
objectives for which the administration may not want to be held le-
gally or politically accountable.     
Ultimately, any final assessment of constraints on executive au-
thority requires a normative theory of the presidency and the extent 
to which agency policy should be shaped by legal norms, political will, 
or bureaucratic expertise. Important tradeoffs inhere in this decision, 
and the calculus likely differs across regulatory contexts. The types of 
constraints appropriate for the enforcement of political minorities’ 
rights may differ from those that should apply in more technical  
or scientific contexts. Nonetheless, although reasonable minds will 
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differ in assessing the extent to which administrative policies should 
be constrained by legal, political, or structural mechanisms, resolu-
tion of the debate is impossible without a concrete understanding of 
the manner in which these constraints actually operate in the real 
world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
